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This study investigates the factors determining the capital structure of Indonesian 
listed companies before and after the implementation of economic reform policies 
subsequent to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. The estimation analysis of the panel 
data for the period 1994-1997 and 2000-2006 reveals several factors that determined 
substantive change in the financing activities of these listed companies.  The capital 
structure of  Indonesian companies had not been explained sufficiently by the 
standardized theory of corporate financing, which had not considered the effects of the 
specific social and political elements as well as business conglomerates, before the Asian 
financial crisis. However, the capital structure of Indonesian companies became fitted 
more to the corporate financing theory, after the influence of social and political factors 
of corporate attributes weakened substantially following the post-crisis reform policies. 
This significant change is considered to result from institutional change caused by the 
financial and corporate reforms in the post-financial crisis era.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Stable economic growth requires a sound and efficient institutional structure. However, 
in developing countries where formal economic institutions are not sufficiently developed, 
informal institutions and codes of economic behaviors play important roles that 
compliment the formal institution (North, 1990). While these functions of informal 
institutions have an economic rationality to a certain extent, they are criticized as the 
major cause of the collusion between banks and companies as well as political influence 
on economic activities.  
It was generally recognized that any weaknesses in corporate finance, such as collusion 
between banks and companies to facilitate excessive borrowing, were critical factors that 
aggravated the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia. The Asian Development Bank (1999) 
and Hill (2000) offer comprehensive views of the Indonesian financial sector. Claessens 
et al. (2000) and Hanazaki & Liu (2003) investigated the background and impact of the 
Asian financial crisis using econometric analysis. 
To achieve a sustainable system, Indonesia promoted structural reforms in corporate 
financing via the Indonesian Bank Reconstruction Agency (IBRA) and the Jakarta 
Initiative. Public funds were injected into the banking sector, to dispose of non-
performing claims in the course of management reorganization in the wake of resignation 
and consolidations. In the corporate sector, where excessive borrowing and over investing 
had become serious problems, many large conglomerates faced a financial crisis and had 
to restructure their business groups. In order to tighten the management disciplines of 
banks and companies, and thereby improve the financial system as a whole, the 
government implemented a series of banking reforms and corporate governance reforms 
in response to the crisis of 1997-98. 
Governments have often conducted major economic reforms after an economic crisis. 
However, the effects of reform are limited since the social code of behaviors and the 
informal institutional framework are not addressed by the reform and survive long after 
the change of formal institutions (North, 1990). In the case of Indonesia, some studies 
suggested that the reform policy was not effective in changing the companies’ behavior. 
Sato (2003) conducted case studies of specific business groups to clarify their ownership 
structures.  
While the effectiveness of economic reforms has important policy implications, the 
authors have found no formal econometric study examining how Indonesian corporate 
financing changed as a result of the financial reforms implemented in response to the 
crisis
1. This study analyzes the financing structure of listed companies in Indonesia before 
and after the Asian financial crisis, examining whether their corporate financing activities 
changed after the reform policies were implemented. To this end, several types of debt 
ratios for companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange are estimated, the applicability 
of standardized theories of corporate finance to Indonesian corporate financing is 
examined, and the influence of Indonesia’s unique social and political factors on 
corporate financing is investigated. The study covers the thirteen years period from 1994 
to 2006, a span that includes both pre-crisis years (FY 1994－FY 1997) when the 
                                                 
1 Taridi (1999) was a pioneering study investigating the capital structure of listed companies in Indonesia 
before the Asian financial crisis. Among the few formal empirical studies on ASEAN countries are Mieno 
(2006), Suto (2003), and Wiwattanakantang(1999).   3
economy was flourishing under the old regime, and post- crisis years (FY 2000‐FY 
2005) when the economy was recovering from chaos through a series of economic 
reforms. 
This study is, first and foremost, a fact-finding endeavor to track the changing 
corporate financing behavior of Indonesian listed companies during the period from 1994 
to 2006. Specifically, this study focuses on four questions. First, did the financing 
behavior of listed companies change as a result of the reforms implemented after the 
Asian financial crisis? Second, if so, what were the major differences in corporate 
financing pre- and post-crisis? Third, how did the post-crisis reforms modernize the 
financial behavior of listed companies? Finally, based on the financial activities of the 
listed companies identified, what are the implications for future corporate financing 
policies in Indonesia? 
This study consists of six sections. Section 2 presents theoretical views for analyzing 
the financing activities of listed companies in Indonesia, based on the adjusted 
Modigliani-Miller theory (trade off theory) and agency cost theory. Section 3 describes 
the characteristics of listed companies in Indonesia and the reform policies conducted in 
the Asian-post-crisis period. Section 4 describes the methodology adopted to perform 
econometric analysis and the data set used for estimation. Section 5 analyses in 
regression the determinants of the capital structure of listed companies, using the panel 
data of individual listed companies. Section 6 summarizes the discussion of previous 
sections, and based on our study results discusses the policy tasks for the consolidation of 
Indonesia’s corporate financing system. 
 
2. Analytical Scope of Listed Companies in Indonesia 
2. 1 Adjusted Modigliani-Miller Theory and Agency Cost Approach 
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory (hereinafter referred to as the 
“MM theory”), corporate value does not depend on capital structure; thus, corporate 
financing has no impact on corporate value when several conditions exist together: a 
complete capital market, perfect information, no corporate tax, no transaction cost, and 
no economic externality. However, the full set of preconditions of the MM theory is not 
likely to exist in the real world; therefore, an adjusted MM theory is required. According 
to the trade-off approach, companies choose the optimal capital structure that minimizes 
the cost of capital so as to maximize the value of the company, in consideration of a risk 
of bankruptcy and the impact of corporate tax. The higher the company’s debt ratio is, the 
lower its average capital cost becomes. However, when the debt ratio is high, the risk of 
bankruptcy also becomes high, resulting in a higher risk premium. The optimal debt ratio 
is associated with maximum corporate value
2. 
According to the agency cost approach, determinants of corporate value (which are the 
determinants of optimal corporate capital structure) are also affected by agency cost, 
taking into account asymmetric information. Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), two of 
the types of conflicts of interest that generate agency cost have received priority: 
relationships between shareholders as principals and management executives as agents; 
and relationships between creditors as principals and shareholders as agents. 
                                                 
2 See Myers and Majluf (1984) for details.    4
The agency cost due to the relationship between shareholders and management 
executives arises from the executives’ pursuit of personal profits and the shareholders’ 
desire to maximize corporate value. This issue could be solved by raising the corporate 
debt ratio and by decreasing management access to free cash flows. Meanwhile, the 
agency problem between creditors and shareholders arises from the shareholders’ desire 
to receive good dividends by appropriating borrowed money or by making management 
undertake high risk/high return investments using the limited liability system. In the case 
of the latter conflict, lowering the corporate debt ratio is one solution to enhance 
corporate value. 
One of the characteristics of listed companies in Indonesian is their highly 
concentrated ownership structure. Therefore, we can equate management executives and 
major shareholders in our description of the principal-agency relationship for listed 
companies in Indonesia. Shareholders have ultimate control over management, so the 
conflicts of interest between management executives and major shareholders are limited 
(Sato, 2003). Even the largest major companies are controlled by small numbers of 
shareholders or tycoon families; therefore, the agency cost problem between management 
executives and major shareholders is very serious. The public-offering ratio is not very 
high, and therefore control over management by major shareholders is typical, even in the 
case of listed companies.  
The existing studies show that information disclosed by companies listed in Indonesia 
is relatively low. As a result, there is high asymmetric information between outside 
creditors and management executives (major shareholders), and the agency cost is also 
consequently high. Therefore, a serious agency cost problem related to fund-raising is 
likely between outside creditors and management executives (major shareholders), or 
between small shareholders and management executives (major shareholders). 
Where there is a serious agency cost problem between creditors as principals and 
management executives as agents (major shareholders), the agency cost becomes high if 
funds are raised by borrowings. Therefore, high-profit companies with high retained 
earnings tend to reduce external borrowing. A company’s capacity to provide collateral is 
also critical as a factor determining agency cost. The larger the fixed assets that are used 
as collateral, in comparison to debt, the more the company’s agency cost is reduced. 
Therefore, companies with large collateral tend to have a high optimal debt ratio. When 
financing by means of borrowed funds, a company’s market visibility is another critical 
factor. The higher the market visibility is, and the more widely corporate management is 
known, the lower asymmetry of information is. When the business scale, the sales 
volume, and the asset size are larger, the agency cost between creditors and the company 
is lower and the optimal debt ratio is higher. 
 
2.2 Informal Codes of Business Behaviors and Networks  
2.2.1 Business Conglomerates and Foreign Joint Ventures 
In developing countries where financial and legal systems are underdeveloped, there is 
considerable constraint on financial activities. Consequently, a tendency has arisen to 
expand activities by borrowing funds externally through the development of quasi 
markets where information sharing is easy and the agency cost problem is considerably 
negligible. With such quasi markets, the company is likely to enjoy an advantage in 
mitigating the agency cost of differentiating its financing activities.   5
For example, a company within a business group can raise funds from a bank in the 
same group at a relatively low cost, so the optimal debt ratio is high. This results from 
three factors: the asymmetry of information between the companies and a bank in the 
same business group is low; companies within the group enjoy favorable loan terms as 
compared with companies on the outside; and companies within the group can count on 
more cooperation from a bank, especially if they experience financial difficulties. 
It is often said that one of the reasons why business conglomerates are formed in 
developing countries is their advantage in financing risk money with the aid of internal 
capital markets. Funds from internal capital markets act as internal funds for companies 
within the group, allowing business risks to be absorbed into the funds. In particular, the 
core business in a group is expected to function as the borrower of external funds, so its 
dependence on debt is apt to be higher than the optimal level for a non-consolidated 
company. Foreign companies  may take different financing routes compare to other 
companies. A foreign company is generally owned and managed by its parent company 
and a local partner. The management information of a foreign company’s local subsidiary 
is shared with the parent company in its home country and so the agency cost problem is 
negligible between the two. Accordingly, fund raising through the parent company bears 
an agency cost that is as low as that achieved through internal funding. Thus, the capital 
expenditures of foreign companies are often funded through investment by the parent 
company. 
 
2.2.2 Informal Business Networks Based on Socio-Political Networks 
The agency cost of external borrowings may be affected by political and social factors, 
such as the ethnic connections or family relationships of management executives (major 
shareholders) as well as a “revolving door” or other relationships with the government. 
Generally, the asymmetry of information between outside investors and the managers of a 
company is increased in developing countries where information disclosure and legal 
systems are less robust than in advanced countries; thus, the political and social factors 
can mitigate or prevent impediments. In reality, the power of contracts is perceived to be 
high when the contracting parties share the same social and cultural background, because 
there is a shared code of conduct that leads to significant social penalties (“loss of face”) 
for contractual defaults (debt defaults) when contractors share the same social and 
cultural backgrounds. 
One example of these factors at play is the difference between ethnic Chinese 
companies and non- ethnic Chinese local companies. There are common cultural and 
social rules for ethnic Chinese companies and ethnic Chinese banks
3. Conversely, the 
cultural and social rules differ between ethnic Chinese companies and non-Chinese 
banks; therefore, they may have difficulty maintaining a relationship of mutual trust. If an 
ethnic Chinese company is financed by a non-Chinese bank, the loan terms might be less 
advantageous.
4 In any case, when an ethnic Chinese company borrows money externally, 
                                                 
3 Okuda (2004) show that social and cultural background may affect the information production conducted 
by banks in Malaysia.  
4 Several studies survey if there is a trusting relationship between Chinese companies and non-Chinese 
banks. Andrew (2008) points out this issue. See Sato (2003) for the relationship between Chinese 
companies and the government of Indonesia.   6
its agency cost may differ from that borne by a non-ethnic Chinese local company, due to 
the disparity of social, cultural, and political background rules.  
The agency cost arising in regard to creditors also depends on whether the company is 
government-linked. If  a company is recognized in the market as being supported or 
guaranteed implicitly by the government, the risk for creditors in financing that company 
is mitigated. In the case of government-linked companies, information sharing through 
the government may minimize the asymmetry of information when dealing with 
government-linked banks. In any case, government-linked companies may have an 
agency relationship with creditors different from that experienced by the private sector in 
general, so their capital structure can have characteristics that are different from the 
structure typically seen in private companies. 
 
2.3 The Effects of Reform Policies after the Asian Financial Crisis  
After the Asian financial crisis, a wide range of financial and corporate reform policies 
were implemented. First, public funds were injected for the liquidation of the failed banks 
that had been severely affected by the Asian financial crisis, those banks’ non-performing 
loans were settled by the IBRA, and the external debt problems of individual companies 
were solved with the help of the Jakarta Initiative. These measures dismantled the special 
ownership structure between banks and business conglomerates, that is, the endemic 
collusion between banks and business conglomerates that were deemed to have 
aggravated the financial crisis (Claessens, 2000)
5.  
Second, for maintaining healthy bank management, the prudential regulations for 
banks were made more stringent, the monitoring power of the monetary authority over 
banking activities was enhanced, and the previously low enforcement capability was 
strengthened. Under the tightened regulations, the responsibility of bank managers came 
to be critically linked to the sound banking operations, and it became difficult for bank 
managers to exploit their private benefit and direct the profit to a specific company.  
Third,  in parallel with the reform of the banking sector, corporate governance 
regulations for listed companies were tightened, and legal mechanisms to handle 
problems such as bankruptcy were developed. The reforms include the improvement of 
information-disclosure, which was necessary to strengthen the corporate governance of 
stockholders in the capital market, and the modernization of bankruptcy laws, which was 
necessary to strengthen the corporate governance of external creditors. 
The restructuring of capital structures and reform of the financial systems instituted 
new management disciplines to prevent collusion between banks and private companies, 
and thereby exercised considerable influence over corporate financing. If these measures 
successfully modernized the country’s corporate financing, analysis would show that the 
influences of social and political factors on the funding of listed companies would be 
weaker after the Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, if the measurements were not 
effective in changing financing attitudes, social and political factors would still be 
recognizable in the post-crisis data. 
 
3. Listed Companies in Indonesia 
3.1 Corporate Attributes and the Classification Method of Listed Companies 
                                                 
5 It was recognized that the enterprise that falls into the excess indebtedness had received the financing 
from the bank in the same business conglomerates.   7
The advantages to this approach to analyzing the listed companies include the 
following
1. First, the available financial data are far more refined than those of unlisted 
companies, so that an in-depth analysis based on the framework of economics becomes 
possible. Second, consistent long-term control of the corporate data of various industries 
leads to a comprehensive overview of corporate finance profiles. The method of this 
study and the knowledge provided by previous case studies are complementary 
approaches, which in combination are expected to greatly expand and deepen the 
understanding of this field. Third, more than half of the major private companies included 
in the top thousand companies by sales ranking are listed on the Indonesian stock market. 
This means that the presence of major private companies reflects an importance that is 
not to be undervalued in the corporate sector or in Indonesia’s economy, despite their 
limited number (Sato, 2004). Accordingly, a thorough analysis of the financing activities 
of listed companies is an essential process for studying issues of consolidating corporate 
finance. 
According to the discussion in the previous section, we classified the listed companies 
into several groups based on their corporate attributes. First, in the classification of 
ownership structure, the major shareholders of each company are categorized as Pribumi 
(so-called “native” Indonesian or ethnic Malay), the ethnic Chinese, the foreign join-
venture, the ethnic Indian, or government controlling companies, on the basis of their 
family names. Therefore, the attribute of the shareholders who have the largest number of 
shares becomes the corporate ownership attribute. When a company’s holding company 
is the largest shareholder, the ownership structure is classified as Pribumi, the ethnic 
Chinese, the foreign join-venture, the ethnic Indian, or government controlling companies, 
on the basis of the family name of the holding company’s largest shareholder. 
Second, when a company belongs to a business conglomerate, its importance and 
centrality are classified on the basis of three standards. A company is classified as a “core 
company” within the conglomerate only when: the directors are not professional 
managers but family members who own the business conglomerate (or its holding 
company); the scale of the company is significantly large within the business 
conglomerate; and the industry of the company is central to the conglomerate. Companies 
that satisfy only two of these three standards are classified as a “major company” within 
the business conglomerate. 
Third, the impact of the Asian financial crisis is undeniable as a special factor affecting 
the financing of listed companies in Indonesia. Companies that underwent reconstruction 
after the crisis may, in contrast to other companies, have been supported in various ways 
to reduce their debts. Consequently, they enjoyed an advantage over unsupported 
companies in regard to debt reduction, which results in a difference in capital structure 
attributable to policy factors. In particular, their proportion of bank borrowing used 
mainly for short-term funding is relatively low compared to that of other companies; in 
fact, it was greatly reduced during the time when these companies were undergoing 
reconstruction. A company belonging to the same business conglomerate both before and 
after the Asian financial crisis was classified as a “non-restructured company.” A 
company belonging to a different business conglomerate after the Asian financial crisis 
was classified as a “restructured company.”  
 
3.2 The Fund-raising Structure of Companies with Different Corporate Attributes   8
When we looked at the ownership attributes of listed companies, ethnic Chinese 
companies accounted for the largest share both before and after the Asian financial crisis. 
According to the number of companies, the share of the total number of listed companies 
occupied by ethnic Chinese companies, the foreign joint venture companies, Pribumi 
companies, government controlling companies, and ethnic Indian companies were 64%, 
20%, 10%, 5%, and 2%, respectively. According to the asset size of companies, the share 
of total assets of all listed companies occupied by ethnic Chinese companies, the foreign 
joint venture companies, Pribumi companies, government controlling companies, and 
ethnic Indian companies were 42%, 27%, 23%, 6%, and 2%, respectively. The averaged 
asset sizes of the ethnic Chinese and Pribumi companies were smaller than those of 
foreign joint venture and government controlling companies. 
The financial characteristics of listed companies are summarized according to different 
ownership attributes in Table 3-1. The ratios of debt to total assets (debt ratios) of listed 
companies tended to increase before the Asian financial crisis, while it decreased after the 
crisis
6. The debt ratios of the ethnic Chinese companies and the ethnic Indian companies 
were almost always higher than those of Pribumi companies, and the debt ratios of 
foreign joint venture companies were similar to those of the ethnic Chinese companies. 
After the Asian financial crisis, the long debt ratios and the ratio of bank borrowing 
substantially decreased, and these ratios fluctuated widely for the government controlling 
and Pribumi companies. 
 
(Table 3-1) Comparison of Listed Companies by Ownership Attributes 
 
  The ratios of before-tax profit to total assets (profit ratio), which represented the 
companies’ capability to earn profits, gradually decreased after the Asian financial crisis, 
then it turned to recover after 2004. The profit ratio of foreign joint venture companies 
and government controlling companies were higher than those of other companies, and 
the before-tax profit ratios of ethnic Chinese companies and Pribumi companies were at 
similar levels. 
The ratios of fixed assets to total assets (fixed asset ratio), which represented the 
companies’ ability to provide collateral, of ethnic Indian companies were the highest, and 
those of Pribumi companies were the lowest. The fixed assets ratio did not differ so much 
among government controlling companies, ethnic Chinese companies, and foreign joint 
venture companies. 
The difference in the financial characteristics between core companies and non-core 
companies belonging to business conglomerates are summarized in Table 3-2. There was 
a tendency for the debt ratios and long-term debt ratios of core companies to be higher 
than those of non-core companies, while the bank borrowing ratios of core companies 
were lower than those of non-core companies. The fixed asset ratios of core companies 
were higher than those of non-core companies. These tendencies did not change before 
and after the Asian financial crisis. While the profit ratios of non-core companies were 
higher than those of core companies before the Asian financial crisis, the difference in the 
profit ratios between core and non-core companies disappeared after the crisis. 
 
                                                 
6 After the Asian financial crisis, some listed companies had the amount of the debts exceeding their assets. 
Those companies are excluded from the sample of data for econometric study in the following sections.   9
(Table 3-2) Comparison of Core and Non-core Companies  
 
The comparison of restructured and non-restructured companies is summarized in   
Table 3-3. There was no significant difference in debt ratios, long-term debt ratios, and 
short-term debt ratios between restructured and non-restructured companies before the 
Asian financial crisis. Since the restructured companies’ finances were remedied through 
debt reduction, the debt ratios of these companies became lower than those of non-
restructured companies after the financial crisis. However, as the Indonesian economy 
recovered, the difference in the debt ratios between restructured and non-restructured 
companies disappeared until 2003, and the debt ratio of non-restructured companies 
became lower than those of restructured companies. 
 
(Table 3-3) Comparison of Restructured and Non-restructured Companies  
 
Before the Asian financial crisis, there was no significant difference in profit ratios 
between restructured and non-restructured companies. After the crisis, the profit ratios of 
restructured companies became lower than those of non-restructured companies. 
Meanwhile, as the economic recovery progressed, the difference in the profit ratios 
between restructured and non-restructured companies ended. 
 
4. Methodology 
We used the following method to analyze the hypotheses described in Section 2. First, 
we estimated the capital structure of the listed companies in Indonesia by using a fixed-
effect unbalanced panel model. The objectives were to the estimate effects of the several 
economic variables, corporate tax and business-risk, explained by the trade off approach; 
and the creditworthiness and ability to provide collateral explained by the agency costs 
theory. The characteristics of each company are contained by the fixed effects in the 
estimation. Second, we regressed the fixed effects (obtained by the first estimation) to the 
dummy variable estimators representing unique characteristics of the Indonesian 
companies. Regression of the fixed effects enables us to observe how the characteristics 
of each company affect its capital structure. We also analyzed the pre-crisis and post-
crisis differences at both of the above steps of analysis (first-step regression and second-
step regression). 
 
4.1. Empirical Model for Debt-Ratios and Economic Variables 
We estimated three types of debt-ratio. The empirical model is expressed as equation 
(1), where DRkit  is type k  debt-ratio for i-th company at time t－1 ,  i   is the fixed-effect 
for i-th company,  1  ijt X  is the explanatory variables for i-th company at time t－1 ,  j   
are the coefficient of 1  ijt X , and   it   is the random error term for i-th company at time t. 
The explanatory variables include the followings; REit-1 is the free cache flow for i-th 
company at time t－1, TAXit-1 is the rate of corporate tax for i-th firm at time t－1, FIXit-1 
is the ability to provide collateral for i-th company at time t－1,  SIZEit-1 is the 
creditworthiness for i-th company at time  1  t , RISKit-1 is the business-risk for i-th 
company at time t－1. AF is the dummy variable for the post-crisis period, BM is the 
dummy variable for the mini-boom period since 2004, YD1996~YD2005 are the year   10
dummies. We used cross terms of AF (or MB) and each variable (except year dummies) 
to observe the change of economic structure from pre-crisis to post-crisis (or from pre-
mini-boom to post-mini-boom) period. To rule out simultaneity between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables, the values of REit-1, TAXit-1, FIXit-1, SIZEit-1, and 










j ijt j i ijtt YD X BM X AF X DR                          1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
 
(1) Dependent Variables 
We estimated by using three types of debt-ratio as independent variables; TDR =the 
total debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets), LDR = the long-term debt ratio (Long-term 
liabilities/total assets), SDR =the short-term debt ratio (short-term liabilities/total assets).  
The total debt ratio shows the rate of liabilities to all capital. It is the most basic index 
for capital structure. It is essential to observe the total debt ratio to analyze how corporate 
tax and business risk affect a company’s capital structure, because these two variables 
affect any debt. 
There is a difference between short-term debt and long-term debt. Short-term debt like 
accounts payable and notes are used for short-term objectives like cash flow. Long-term 
debt is used for long-term objectives like capital expenditures (e.g., investments financed 
by long-maturity instruments). Because both lender and borrower are firms, there is less 
asymmetrical information when short-debt like accounts payable is used, than when other 
financial devices are used. On the other hand, there is more asymmetrical information 
when long-term debt is used. The agency cost associated with long-term debt has a 
stronger effect than that associated with short-term debt.  
We predicted that the short-term bank debt ratio would be different from the total debt 
ratio and long-term debt ratio, because banks are the most important creditors and have a 
superior ability to get information about borrowers. 
 
 (2) Explanatory Variables 
The following explanatory variables and their definitions apply to equation (1). 
RE: The rate of retained earnings is defined as (retained earnings) / (total assets). We 
used it as a proxy of free cash flow. While profit rates like return on assets are frequently 
used in other studies, we used the rate of retained earnings because it seems more stable 
than profits rates. Free cash flow incurs less agency cost than other financial sources. The 
greater the company’s free cash flow, the less agency cost incurs. It was expected that the 
sign of RE would be negative. 
TAX: The rate of corporate tax is defined as ((profits before tax – profits after tax)/ 
total assets). We used it as a proxy of the effect of corporate tax. Although the corporate 
tax rate of each individual firm is often used in other studies, corporate tax rates do not 
include deferred tax assets and tax-premiums. Considering this point, we calculated the 
tax rate as described and used it as a proxy. A high rate of corporate tax makes a firm 
increase its debt ratio in order to reduce the tax payment. Therefore, it was predicted that 
the sign of the rate of corporate tax would be negative. 
FIX: The ratio of fixed assets is defined as (tangible fixed assets)/(total assets). We 
used it as a proxy of the ability to provide collateral. Tangible fixed assets are easy to 
pledge as collateral and thus decrease agency costs of borrowing. The more tangible the   11
firm’s assets, the greater its ability to issue secured debt and the less information it has to 
reveal about future profits. Therefore, it is predicted that the sign of the ratio of fixed 
assets would be positive. 
SIZE: The firm’s size is defined as the natural logarithmic of total assets. We used it as 
a proxy of the creditworthiness in the market.  The more visible the company is, the 
lower its agency costs and the more debt it can issue. It was predicted that the sign of a 
firm’s size would be positive. 
RISK: The business risk is defined as the deviation of the absolute values of the 
operating losses divided by total assets, from 1994 to 1997 and 2000 to 2003
7. The 
volatility of a company’s stock price or profits is often used as a proxy of business risk. 
However, due to the characteristics of the stock market in Indonesia, there is a tendency 
for well-performing listed companies to have a wide fluctuation in their stock price or 
profits. To avoid this problem, we determined the business risk from the level of losses. 
In other words, the more business risk the firm has, the greater the risk of bankruptcy and 
the creditors suffering losses. It was predicted that the sign of company’s business risk 
would be negative.  
YD1996 ~YD2003: Year dummy variables were created for each year. We used this 
dummy to control the change in macroeconomic environments. 
AF: The crisis dummy variable is defined as 0 if the year is 1998 or earlier, and 1 if the 
year is 1999 or later. We used this dummy to observe the change after the financial crisis. 
BM: The mini-boom dummy variable is defined as 0 if the year is 2004 or later, and 1 
if the year is 2003 or earlier. We used this dummy to observe the change after the mini-
boom since 2004. 
 
4.2   Empirical Model for Fixed Effects and Corporate Attributes 
We regressed the fixed effects  i  ˆ , which were obtained by equation (1), on 
independent variables and the corporate specific attributes explained in Section 2 as 
explanatory variables. We calculated  i  ˆ  from the estimation results of three different 
types of debt ratios; the total debt ratio, the long-term debt ratio, and the short-term debt 
ratio. 
The empirical model is expressed as equation (2), where C is the constant term,  ij A  is 
the dummy variable for the corporate attributes of i-th company,  j   is the coefficient of 
ij A ,  j   is the coefficient of the cross term of  ij A  and the post crisis dummy variable AC, 
j ID  is the dummy variable for each industry,  j   is coefficient of  j ID , m is the number 
of corporate attributes, n is the number of industries, and  i   is a random error term.  
 









ij j it i ID A AC A C                
   1 1 1
ˆ    
 
We used the following dummy variables for the ownership structure, the core company 
of a business conglomerate, and the post-crisis restructuring, which are all explained in 
                                                 
7  We calculated it by including data from times when the firm’s retained earnings were negative.   12
Section 3. In addition, we used the dummy variables for industries as control variables. 
The categorization of industries was based on ECFIN (2003). 
Ownership attributes: According to the classification in Section 3, we used the dummy 
variables for the ownership structure, including dummy variables for Pribumi, the ethnic 
Chinese companies (EthnicChinese), the foreign join-venture companies (Foreign), the 
ethnic Indian companies (EthnicIndian), or government controlling companies 
(Government). The value of each ownership structure is 1 if the firm fits its category, or 0 
if the firm is not identified by the category
8. 
Core company of a  business conglomerate: According to the classification in Section 
3, we used the dummy variables for the core business companies (Core). The value of 
core business companies is 1 if the firm fits its category, or 0 if the firm is not identified 
by the category. 
Post-crisis restructuring: According to the classification in Section 3, we used the 
dummy variables for the restructured companies (Restructured). This categorization of a 
company as restructured or not depends on whether it changed its business group after the 
Asian financial crisis. Specifically, if the company belonged to the same business group 
in 2003 as it did in 1997, it is classified as non-restructured; otherwise, it is considered a 
restructured company. The value of restructured companies is 1 if the firm fits its 
category, or 0 if the firm is not identified by the category. 
 
4.3   Data Description 
We analyzed the listed companies that were not financial companies. The data related 
to financial statements includes values from 1994 to 2005, and the data related to 
corporate attributes is as of 2003. 
The financial statement data from 1994 to 1995 and 2003 to 2005 are based on the 
Indonesia Financial Market Directory (1996, 1997, 2003, 2004，and 2005 editions), 
published by the ECFIN. The data from 1996 to 1997 was taken from the JETRO-IDE 
database of the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
9. 
Data from 1998 to 1999 was omitted because of the Asian financial crisis. Samples 
whose retained earnings were negative were excluded as abnormal values. In order to 
avoid simultaneity, we used the explanatory variables for a period prior to the dependent 
variables.  
Table 4-1 shows the basic statistics of dependent and explanatory variables and the 
correlation coefficients between them. There is no especially high correlation coefficient. 
 
(Table 4-1) Basic Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1   Estimated Results of Debt Ratios  
 Table 5-1 shows the estimation results of equation (1), which represents the effects of 
economic factors on the capital structure of listed companies. For the total debt ratio, 
long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio, according to the Hausman test, the fixed 
effect model was selected. Most of the coefficient estimators were statistically significant 
                                                 
8 The categorization incorporates information on the business status of listed companies obtained through a 
series of interview at P. T. Nomura Indonesia, a local subsidiary of Nomura Securities Co.Ltd.  
9 This database was created by Yuri Sato and Miki Takeda of Institute of Developing Economies, Japan 
External Trade Organization.   13
and followed their expected signs. The adjusted R-square values were higher than those 
in the previous works examining capital structure of ASEAN companies, and the F-
values were large enough. Overall, we obtained satisfactory results for the cost function 
estimation. 
 
(Table 5-1) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios 
 
Before the Asian financial crisis, the estimation results of debt ratios were not well 
consistent with the corporate financing theory explained in Section 2. The coefficients of 
many explanatory variables had the sign contrary to the theoretical expectation, or they 
were statistically insignificant. This observation suggests that corporate fund tapping 
activities in Indonesia before the Asian financial crisis differed from those predicted by 
standardized corporate financing theory. 
In the estimation of total debt ratio before the Asian financial crisis, only the 
coefficient estimate of the rate of retained earnings (RE) was statistically significant and 
consistent with the theoretically expected sign, that is, negative (-0.077). However, the 
coefficient of corporate tax (TAX) was a significantly negative value (-0.468), which was 
inconsistent with the theoretical expectation. The coefficient estimates of other variables, 
i.e., the business risk (RISK), the firm’s creditworthiness (SIZE), and the fixed assets ratio 
(FIX) were statistically insignificant. 
The estimated results of the long-term debt ratio were more consistent with the 
theoretical expectation. The coefficient of the business risk (RISK) was significantly 
negative (-0.098), the coefficient of the rate of retained earnings (RE) was significantly 
negative (-0.078), and the coefficient of the firm’s creditworthiness (SIZE) was 
significantly positive (0.085), all of which were consistent with the expectation of 
corporate financing theory.   
The estimation result of short-term debt was not consistent with the theoretical 
expectation at all
10. The coefficient estimates of the business risk (RISK) was significantly 
positive (0.103), while the coefficient of the corporate tax (TAX) was significantly 
negative (-0.285), the coefficient of the fixed assets ratio (FIX) was significantly negative 
(-0.097), and the coefficient of the firm’s creditworthiness (SIZE) was significantly 
negative (-0.064). These results were all opposite to the theoretical prediction. 
After the economic reforms in the post Asian financial crisis, corporate fund tapping 
activities in Indonesia changed into theoretically expected post-crisis activities. The 
estimation results of the debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio, proved 
to be much more consistent with the expectation of corporate financing theory. This 
suggests that the economic reforms modernized the corporate fund raising activities in 
Indonesia, which were explainable by economic rationality under the modernized 
institutional frameworks. We found that the strengthened prudential regulation 
implemented after the crisis and the modernized bankruptcy law had the affect of making 
                                                 
10 The estimation result of short-term bank borrowing ratio was not well consistent with the corporate 
financing theory both pre- and post-crisis periods. In the estimation of short-term bank borrowing ratio (see 
Table A1 in the appendix), the coefficients of most explanatory variables have the sign opposite to the 
theoretical expectation, or they were statistically insignificant. This observation suggests that the short-term 
fund raising activities of listed companies were influenced temporally by ad hoc factors during the entire 
study period.   14
the fixed assets ratio consistent with the corporate financing theory. 
 In the estimation of the debt ratio, the coefficient of the post-crisis dummy and the 
cross term of corporate tax (AF*TAX) had a significantly positive values (0.486) and the 
coefficient of post-crisis dummy and fixed assets (AF*SIZE) had a significantly positive 
values (0.124). This implies that, after the Asian financial crisis, the influence of tax and 
fixed assets ratio on debt ratios became consistent with the standard theory of corporate 
financing
11. The coefficient of the post-crisis dummy and the rate of retained earnings 
(AF*RE) had a significantly negative value (-0.112), while the coefficient of the post-
crisis dummy and the firm’s creditworthiness (AF*SIZE) had a significantly positive 
values (0.034). This implies that, after the Asian financial crisis, the theoretically 
expected influence of retained earnings and the firm’s creditworthiness was enhanced. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the mini-boom dummy and tax (BM*TAX) had a 
significantly positive value (0.468), and the coefficient of mini-boom dummy and the 
retained earnings ratio (BM*RE) had a significantly negative value (-0.123). This 
suggests that the theoretically expected influence of tax and the retained earnings were 
more strengthened. 
In the estimation of the long-term debt ratio, the coefficient of the cross term of post-
crisis dummy and corporate tax (AF*TAX) was significantly positive (0.182), and the 
coefficient of the cross term of the post-crisis dummy and the firm’s creditworthiness 
(AF*SIZE) was significantly positive (0.077). This implies that, after the Asian financial 
crisis, the influence of tax and fixed assets ratio on long-term debt ratios was consistent 
with the expectation of corporate financing theory. Furthermore, the coefficient of the 
mini-boom dummy and tax (BM*TAX) had a significantly positive value (0.153), which 
implies that the theoretically expected influence of tax was stronger. 
Similar to the estimation of debt and long-term debt ratio, in the estimation of short-
term debt ratio, the coefficient of the cross term of the post-crisis dummy and corporate 
tax (AF*TAX) was significantly positive (0.266), the coefficient of the cross term of the 
post-crisis dummy and the retained earnings (AF*RE) was significantly negative (-0.121), 
and the coefficient of the cross term of post-crisis dummy and the firm’s creditworthiness 
(AF*SIZE) was significantly negative (0.074). This observation suggests that, after the 
post-crisis economic reforms, the influence of these economic factors on the short-term 
debt ratio was consistent with the expectation of corporate financing theory. Moreover, 
the coefficient of the mini-boom dummy and tax (BM*TAX) had a significantly positive 
value (0.285) and the coefficient of the mini-boom dummy and the firm’s 
creditworthiness (BM*SIZE) had a significantly positive value (0.043). This suggests that, 
after the mini-boom since 2004, the theoretically expected influence of tax and the firm’s 
creditworthiness was further enhanced. 
The coefficients of dummy variables for the years from 1996 and 1997 were positive, 
and those for the years after 2001 were negative. Although most of these coefficients 
were not statistically significant enough
12, this shift suggests that listed companies tended 
to decrease their debts after the Asian crisis. 
                                                 
11 After the Asian financial crisis, the total coefficient estimate of tax became positive (-0.468+0.486>0) 
and the total coefficient estimate of fixed assets ratio became positive (-0.054+  0.124>0), too, as 
theoretically expected. 
12 The coefficient of the dummy variable for the year 1997 was significantly positive for all types of debt-
ratio.   15
 
5.2. Estimation Results of Companies’ Fixed Effects 
The estimation results of companies’ fixed effects by using dummy variables for the 
company’s attribute as explanatory variables are summarized in Table 5-2. While the 
value of adjusted R
2 was not high, the selection of explanatory variables was not at fault 
in the sense that the values of F-tests are statistically significant enough.  
 
(Table 5-2) Estimation Results of Companies’ Fixed Effects 
 
Before the Asian financial crisis, the ownership attributes affected all types of debt-
rates. The coefficient estimates of the dummy variables representing the companies’ 
ownership attributes, such as the ethnic Chinese dummy (EthnicChinese), government 
controlling dummy (Government), the foreign joint venture dummy (Foreign), the ethnic 
Indian dummy (EthnicIndian) had significant effects on the debt ratio, long-term debt 
ratio, and short-term debt ratio. This suggested that, in the pre-crisis period, the fund 
raising structures of listed companies were affected strongly by the social and political 
networks they possessed. 
In the estimation of debt ratio, the coefficient estimate of the ethnic Chinese dummy, 
the foreign joint venture dummy, and the ethnic Indian dummy were positive (0.061, 
0.107, 0.098, respectively) and statistically significant. In the estimation of long-term 
debt ratio, the ethnic Chinese dummy, the government controlling dummy, and the ethnic 
Indian dummy were positive (0.039, 0.054, 0.172, respectively) and statistically 
significant. In the estimation of short-term debt ratio, the coefficient estimate of the 
foreign joint venture dummy was positive (0.099) and statistically significant. These 
observations suggested that, compared to the Pribumi companies, the ethnic Chinese, the 
government controlling, the foreign joint venture, and the ethnic Indian companies had 
some social, political or economic networks that were used for tapping external debt 
funds at lower agency cost. These results supported the commonly cited stories that the 
ethnic Chinese and Indian companies had strong financial ties to their ethnic business 
communities, that the government controlling companies had implicit financial support, 
and that foreign joint ventures tapped their needed funds from abroad at low cost. On the 
other hand, the Pribumi companies without strong business or political networks had 
more difficulty in raising debt from external creditors at low agency cost. 
After the economic reforms in the Asian post-financial crisis period, the effect of the 
corporate ownership attributes became very weak drastically in the estimation of debt 
ratio as well as long-term debt ratio. The coefficient estimates of cross terms of the post-
crisis dummy variable and corporate ownership attributes had the opposite signs from 
those before the Asian crisis occurred. In the mini-boom period after 2003, the influence 
of corporate ownership attributes became weaker. 
In the estimation of debt ratio, the coefficient estimates of the cross terms of the mini-
boom dummy and the ethnic Chinese dummy (AC*EthnicChinese) was negative (-0.050) 
and statistically significant. In the estimation of long-term debt, the coefficient estimates 
of the cross terms of the economic reform dummy and the ethnic Chinese 
(AC*EthnicChinese), the government controlling dummy (AC*Government), and the 
foreign joint venture dummy (AC*Foreign) were all negative (-0.053, -0.111, -0.122, 
respectively) and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the cross 
terms of the mini-boom dummy and the ethnic Chinese (BM*EthnicChinese), the   16
government controlling dummy (BM*Government), and the foreign joint venture dummy 
(BM*Foreign) were statistically significant and negative (-0.052, -0.111, -0.032, 
respectively). 
Before the Asian financial crisis, the core companies in the business conglomerates 
tended to borrow funds more eagerly than other companies. In the estimation of debt ratio, 
long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio, the coefficient estimate of the core 
companies (Core) was statistically significant and positive (0.038, 0.020, 0.017, 
respectively) in the pre-crisis period. This was consistent with the frequently cited 
understanding that the core companies functioned as the window through which business 
conglomerates tapped external funds and redistributed them among companies belonging 
to the conglomerates
13. 
After the post-crisis economic reforms, the business conglomerates normalized their 
fund raising structure by reducing the external debt, especially the short-term debt. In the 
estimation of the debt ratio and short-term debt ratio, the coefficient estimates of the core 
company dummy that were crossed with the after-crisis dummy (AC*Core) were 
statistically significant and negative (-0.054 and -0.048, respectively). This implied that 
the core companies more aggressively decreased their debt ratio than other companies, 
especially in reducing their short-term debt ratio.  
However, the business conglomerates retained the special function of the core 
companies to raise long-term debt funds from external creditors. Meanwhile, in the 
estimation of the long-term debt ratio, the coefficient estimates of the cross term of the 
after-crisis dummy and the core company dummy in the long-term debt ratio was 
insignificant. Moreover, in the mini-boom after 2003, in the estimation of the long-term 
debt ratio, the coefficient estimates of the cross term of the mini boom dummy and the 
core company dummy (BM*Core) was significantly positive (0.036). These observations 
suggested that the core business of each business conglomerate is still responsible for 
borrowing long-term external funds after the Asian financial crisis, and that, as the 
demand for investment funds recovered in the mini boom, the business conglomerates 
expanded the special function of core companies to raise long-term debt funds from 
outside.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The modernization and the rationalization of corporate activity are important policy 
tasks for sustainable economic development, which requires the modernization of 
institutional frameworks in developing economies. The wide-ranging economic reforms 
pursued by the Indonesian government after the Asian financial crisis gives us an 
interesting example for examining how the development of formal economic systems 
help change the economic behaviors of private companies. This study is the first attempt 
to investigate the influence of institutional changes on companies’ corporate financing 
activities by clarifying the factors determining the capital structure of Indonesian listed 
companies before and after the implementation of reform policies subsequent to the 
Asian financial crisis. The estimation analysis of the panel data for the period 1994-1997 
                                                 
13 The coefficient estimate of the cross term of the post crisis reform dummy and the restructure companies 
dummy was a significantly negative value (-0.022) in the estimation of the debt ratio.    17
and 2000-2006 reveals several factors that determined substantive change in the financing 
activities of these listed companies. 
Our investigation makes three contributions to this area of study. First, we found that 
the capital structure of Indonesian companies had not been explained sufficiently by the 
standard theory of corporate financing, which had not considered the effects of its 
specific social and political elements, as well as business conglomerates, before the Asian 
financial crisis. The estimation results prove that differences in corporate attributes had 
some influence on companies’ fund raising activities. These observations suggested that 
the formal economic system that is assumed in the standard theory of corporate financing 
did not function well enough, and an informal code of common practices had a 
measurably large influence on the corporate capital structure in an Indonesian listed 
company before the Asian financial crisis. 
Second, we found that the corporate financing behaviors of Indonesian listed 
companies changed after the economic reforms during the post-crisis period.  Our 
estimation results show that the earlier significant differences in capital structure between 
companies possessing different socio-economic backgrounds, such as the ethnic Chinese 
companies, government controlling companies, and foreign joint venture companies, and 
the ethnic Indian companies, almost disappeared after the reforms.  The post-crisis 
financing activities of listed companies in Indonesia are explainable by economic 
rationality. Any particular skew or constraint peculiar to Indonesia that was seen before 
the Asian financial crisis is no longer discernible in major explanatory variables, such as 
the profit yearnings ratio, collateral capacity, or corporate tax effects. These facts suggest 
that the fund raising activities of listed companies in Indonesia are becoming rational as a 
result of the post-crisis economic reforms that were designed to ensure the sound 
management of banks and the consolidation of corporate governance. The restructuring 
of capital structures and the reforms of Indonesian financial systems succeeded in 
building an institutional framework in which Indonesian companies could conduct fund 
raising activities based on economic rationality, not influenced by their social and 
political factors. 
Our third contribution illustrates the limitation of reforms. The estimation results 
demonstrate that the agency cost incurred by information asymmetry was a critical 
determinant in corporate financing in Indonesia even after the Asian financial crisis and 
collateral providing capacity has the most significant impact on determinants of long-
term debt ratio. Poor capacity to provide collateral and low transparency to outside 
creditors could become serious constraints on a company’s borrowing even though its 
other corporate operational characteristics were equal to  those of competitors. Only 
companies with a high collateral providing capability are able to borrow long-term 
external funds. 
Another limitation of reform involves the companies’ membership in a business 
conglomerate. For companies having a strong influence over the other members of their 
group, there is a tendency to have a higher long-term debt ratio and a lower short-term 
debt ratio than other companies. This tendency suggests that core companies within a 
business group can still function as a conduit of long-term external funds to other 
members of their group; they raise long-term funds by taking advantage of their relatively   18
low agency cost in tapping funds from outside creditors, and redistribute the those funds 
to other companies within the group
14.  
To solve these persistent problems, it is necessary to promote corporate information 
disclosure for the benefit of external investors and creditors. Furthermore, it is essential to 
build a legal framework for smooth liquidation of collateral and speedy reconstruction of 
failed companies. Despite the implementation of reform policies after the Asian financial 
crisis, there is still a desperate need for enhancing information disclosure and the legal 
infrastructure (Sato [2004]). In tandem with solution of these problems, the development 
of capital markets such as stock and debenture markets is required to meet the demand of 

































                                                 
14  The mechanism of the existence of the internal capital market and the re-capital distribution in the 
financial clique could not be pursued in the present study where only the listed company was analyzed. It 
will be necessary to analyze the funding action of a financial clique system enterprise including non-listed 
companies to analyze this problem further.   19
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（Table 3-1）Comparison of Listed Companies by Ownership Attributes 
                                 （ % ）  
      1994  1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total debt ratio       
Pribumi   35.8  42.1  53.9 64.9 41.0 31.9 32.8 30.1 46.7 47.2
Ethnic Chinese   46.3  49.1  52.7 69.0 48.7 45.0 43.7 46.0 47.8 48.3
Government controlling   44.9  43.5  45.1 58.3 48.2 47.3 45.5 57.8 44.4 42.6
Foreign joint venture   45.6  53.4  53.0 65.8 46.6 44.8 43.3 45.1 45.6 46.3
Ethnic Indian   59.2  61.3  61.2 68.3 42.8 47.3 48.1 57.0 55.6 57.8
Short-term debt ratio       
Pribumi  22.8 27.2 30.6 46.2 30.1 26.6 27.7 16.8 31.0 27.9
Ethnic Chinese    33.0 34.8 33.3 45.1 29.6 29.5 28.1 29.8 29.0 30.4
Government controlling    20.7 25.0 22.7 25.1 34.7 35.6 33.0 31.0 22.3 21.2
Foreign joint venture    33.9 40.9 42.1 49.6 30.0 31.5 27.6 29.4 28.4 29.0
Ethnic Indian    35.6 30.9 31.4 27.8 28.9 31.9 32.3 34.3 30.9 26.8
Long-term debt ratio       
Pribumi  15.1 16.4 21.8 25.7 20.7 16.8 17.3 17.8 20.9 20.2
Ethnic Chinese    10.6 11.7 15.2 20.9 13.9 10.6 11.1 13.8 14.2 15.6
Government controlling    33.0 28.0 39.8 41.0 25.3 28.8 35.9 30.6 33.7 26.1
Foreign joint venture   ─   1.4 0.9 1.3 22.1 27.0 28.6  32.6  36.6 34.0
Ethnic Indian   ─   ─  ─ ─ ─ ─ ─  ─  ─ ─
Short-term bank borrowing ratio       
Pribumi    11.7 13.1 14.5 21.9 14.9 8.5 5.8  1.5  3.0 2.9
Ethnic Chinese    16.3 16.9 16.4 22.8 9.9 13.1 11.6 11.2  7.7 12.8
Government controlling    7.4 7.3 6.1 12.7 7.8 13.8 12.2 6.7 2.1 7.1
Foreign joint venture    16.2 19.3 20.0 26.3 11.0 13.3 9.4 10.7  ─ 25.5
Ethnic Indian    21.7 12.8 11.4 3.7 ─ ─ ─  ─  ─ ─
Before-tax profit ratio       
Pribumi    7.8 7.2 6.5 7.4 6.5 5.20 2.5 8.9 6.8 6.8
Ethnic Chinese    9.6 7.6 5.7 8.6 5.6 6.0 5.6 6.4 6.1 6.1
Government controlling    8.4 8.9 5.3 14.8 12.6 6.6 9.6  14.0  14.5 14.5
Foreign joint venture    15.2 16.8  8.9 17.8 15.2 12.9 11.2 14.8 15.1 15.1
Ethnic Indian    8.5 7.5 5.8 7.2 3.3 -4.7 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.4
Surplus ratio       
Pribumi    8.5 18.7 11.5 14.1 14.1 11.9 20.1 18.2 17.7 17.7
Ethnic Chinese    11.2 16.8 13.9 17.3 17.5 19.5 21.2 20.6 21.9 21.9
Government controlling    16.4 17.5 12.7 22.2 21.4 22.1 16.9 25.9 27.1 27.1
Foreign joint venture    22.1 33.9 18.6 27.3 30.6 31.6 35.3 33.1 32.5 32.5
Ethnic Indian    15.2 17.2 12.1 13.1 10.9 7.8 13.0 13.9 13.2 13.2
Fixed asset ratio       
Pribumi    37.5 39.2 34.3 31.3 28 30.2 28.9 32.8 34.9 36.7
Ethnic Chinese    38.0 40.2 40.6 40.7 39.9 39.2 41.0 39.3 39.5 38.4
Government controlling    44.9 47.8 58.1 54.5 39.8 34.1 35.3 39.6 52.5 53.4
Foreign joint venture    31.8 45.1 41.8 41.4 31.1 31.4 34.5 34.7 38.3 36.2
Ethnic Indian    35.4 44.3 56.3 52.4 39.6 46.5 46.0 55.1 53.5 50.8
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（Table 3-2）Comparison of Core and Non-core Companies 
      1994  1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total debt ratio      
Core   46.7 50.5 54.2 69.6 50.3 46.6 44.8 46.6 49.2 49.6
Non-core   43.5 47.8 49.7 63.2 42.8 38.9 38.7 42.5 43.9 44.6
Short-term debt ratio      
Core   31.7 34.3 33.6 44.3 29.8 29.9 28.0 28.7 28.3 29.4
Non-core   32.5 36.8 36.1 45.8 30.4 30.0 28.4 28.7 29.8 29.0
Long-term debt ratio      
Core   15.1 16.4 21.8 25.7 20.7 16.8 17.3 17.8 20.9 20.2
Non-core   10.6 11.7 15.2 20.9 13.9 10.6 11.1 13.8 14.2 15.6
Short-term bank borrowing ratio      
Core   15.0  15.5 15.3 21.6 8.8 12.3 10.2 9.7 4.8 9.0
Non-core   17.1 18.5 19.3 25.1 13.4 13.1 11.0 11.1 11.6 17.4
Before tax profit ratio      
Core   38.3 40.9 42.4 42.0 40.8 38.7 41.6 41.1 41.8 40.7
Non-core   34 43.1 39.8 39.0 30.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 35.7 35.2
Surplus ratio      
Core   8.7 8.2 6.4 ─ 9.3 6.6 7.4 7.8 8.7 8.8
Non-core   14.5 12.7 6.5 ─ 13.1 10.3 8.1 5.6 9.6 8.6
Fixed asset ratio      
Core   11.3 18.3 12.5 8.6 17.8 19.2 21.5 23.9 22.4 24.4
Non-core   18.4 25.9 19.0 14.1 21.5 21.4 20.6 25.7 24.8 23.3
 
（Table 3-3）Comparison of Restructured and Non-restructured Companies 
        1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total debt ratio    
Restructured    42.9 51.2 51.6 69.8 42.4 34.5 36.9 44.0 49.0 50.4
Non-restructured    46.3 49.1 52.9 66.7 48.5 45.7 43.7 45.2 46.3 46.3
Short-term debt ratio    
Restructured    29.6 37.5 34.1 45.1 27.9 27.3 27.3 27.2 30.9 31.0
Non-restructured    32.6 34.5 34.5 44.7 30.7 30.7 28.5 29.1 28.2 28.5
Long-term debt ratio    
Restructured    13.3 14.8 18.0 24.9 15.2 8.9 10.9 16.8 18.1 19.4
Non-restructured    13.5 14.8 20.1 23.9 18.6 15.6 15.8 16.1 18.1 17.8
Short-term bank borrowing ratio    
Restructured    15.0 18.2 15.7 24.2 14.5 11.0 6.9  8.0 9.6 16.8
Non-restructured    15.8 15.9 16.7 22.1 9.8 13.0 11.3 10.7 6.0 10.3
Before tax profit ratio    
Restructured    13.3 14.8 18.0 24.9 15.2 8.9 10.9 16.8 18.1 19.4
Non-restructured    13.5 14.8 20.1 23.9 18.6 15.6 15.8 16.1 18.1 17.8
Surplus ratio    
Restructured    13.2 13.5 5.9 ─ 8.3 6.7 5.3 3.7 6.4 6.4
Non-restructured    10.0 8.7 6.6 ─ 11.7 8.9 8.5 7.6 10.0 9.7
Fixed asset ratio    
Restructured    13.3 14.8 18.0 24.9 15.2 8.9 10.9 16.8 18.1 19.4
Non-restructured    13.5 14.8 20.1 23.9 18.6 15.6 15.8 16.1 18.1 17.8
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(Table 4-1) Basic statistics and correlation matrix 
 
  
Statistics Correlation  Matrix     
   Debt  ratios           
Mean Std  DA1 DA2 DA3 DA4 RISK TAX RE FIX SIZE
DA1  0.549  0.219  1.000          
DA2  0.188  0.171  0.549  1.000         
DA3  0.361  0.190  0.657  -0.269  1.000        
DA4  0.157  0.143  0.399  -0.210  0.649  1.000       
RISK  0.090  0.308  0.025  -0.059 0.083 0.096 1.000         
TAX  0.013 0.156  -0.073 -0.055 -0.034 -0.015  0.000  1.000       
RE  0.155 0.207  -0.218 -0.205 -0.066 -0.035 -0.050  0.012  1.000     
FIX  0.400 0.242  -0.009  0.217 -0.207 -0.091 -0.020 -0.042  0.335  1.000   
SIZE  5.591 0.556  0.266  0.466 -0.114 -0.175 -0.135 -0.007 -0.108 -0.019  1.000
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(Table 5-1) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios 
 
coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value
RISK 0.001 0.024 0.981 -0.098 -2.296  0.022 ** 0.103 2.023 0.043 ** 0.062 1.608 0.109
TAX t-1 -0.468 -4.334  0.000 *** -0.153 -1.773  0.077 * -0.285 -2.779  0.006 *** -0.087 -1.101  0.271
RE t-1 -0.077 -2.207  0.028 ** -0.078 -1.976  0.049 ** 0.022 0.466 0.641 0.028 0.923 0.356
FIX t-1 -0.054 -1.487  0.137 0.020 0.585 0.559 -0.097 -2.446  0.015 ** -0.038 -1.245  0.214
SIZE t-1 0.036 1.619 0.106 0.085 4.643 0.000 *** -0.064 -2.930  0.003 *** 0.012 0.385 0.700
AF*RISK 0.115 0.920 0.358 -0.107 -1.082  0.280 0.214 1.809 0.071 * 0.247 2.108 0.036 **
AF*TAX t-1 0.486 4.324 0.000 *** 0.182 2.027 0.043 ** 0.266 2.493 0.013 ** 0.087 1.047 0.296
AF*RE t-1 -0.112 -2.112  0.035 ** -0.007 -0.145  0.885 -0.121 -2.058  0.040 ** -0.021 -0.377  0.706
AF*FIX t-1 0.124 2.298 0.022 ** 0.077 1.663 0.097 * 0.056 1.008 0.314 0.068 1.171 0.242
AF*SIZE t-1 0.034 1.706 0.088 * -0.026 -1.601  0.110 0.074 3.788 0.000 *** 0.004 0.149 0.881
BM*RISK -0.003 -0.011  0.991 -0.170 -0.751  0.453 0.146 0.541 0.588 0.506 1.212 0.226
BM*TAX t-1 0.468 4.333 0.000 *** 0.153 1.771 0.077 * 0.285 2.780 0.006 *** 0.115 0.663 0.508
BM*RE t-1 -0.123 -2.017  0.044 ** -0.041 -0.746  0.456 -0.104 -1.605  0.109 -0.140 -1.024  0.306
BM*FIX t-1 0.016 0.259 0.796 0.030 0.580 0.562 -0.012 -0.187  0.852 -0.041 -0.316  0.752
BM*SIZE t-1 -0.018 -0.853  0.394 -0.045 -2.677  0.008 *** 0.043 2.127 0.034 ** 0.023 0.379 0.705
YD1996 0.009 0.631 0.528 0.022 1.795 0.073 * -0.005 -0.327  0.744 -0.011 -0.895  0.371
YD1997 0.164 10.538 0.000 *** 0.058 4.558 0.000 *** 0.112 7.442 0.000 *** 0.056 4.164 0.000 ***
YD2001 -0.224 -2.038  0.042 ** 0.152 1.667 0.096 * -0.454 -4.177  0.000 *** -0.080 -0.611  0.541
YD2002 -0.246 -2.222  0.027 ** 0.139 1.514 0.131 -0.464 -4.240  0.000 *** -0.092 -0.698  0.485
YD2003 -0.223 -2.007  0.045 ** 0.149 1.613 0.107 -0.452 -4.119  0.000 *** -0.088 -0.669  0.504
YD2004 0.126 1.124 0.262 0.298 3.247 0.001 *** -0.254 -2.324  0.020 ** -0.124 -0.331  0.741
YD2005 0.135 1.208 0.227 0.303 3.312 0.001 *** -0.251 -2.296  0.022 ** -0.072 -0.192  0.848
The number of




note)  *, **, and *** singnificant at 10, 5, and 1percent level, respectively.
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
4.8027 *** 4.8009 *** 5.8182 *** 4.3464 ***
0.662732 0.623827 0.561545 0.145489
235 233 233 208
1137 1100 1100 684
Total debt-ratio（TDR ） Long-term debt ratio（LDR ） Short-term debt-ratio (SDR ) Short-term bank debt ratio（SBDR）
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(Table 5-2) Estimation Results of Company’s Fixed Effects 
 
coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value
0.217 9.418 0.000 *** -0.319 -18.796  0.000 *** 0.632 32.953 0.000 *** 0.112 4.920 0.000 ***
Ethnic Chinese 0.061 2.915 0.004 *** 0.039 2.490 0.013 ** 0.018 1.014 0.311 0.024 1.282 0.200
Government 0.046 1.311 0.190 0.054 2.131 0.033 ** -0.011 -0.368  0.713 -0.070 -2.199  0.028 **
Foreign 0.107 4.794 0.000 *** 0.017 1.004 0.315 0.099 5.215 0.000 *** 0.042 2.014 0.044 **
Ethnic Indian 0.100 1.881 0.060 * 0.172 4.476 0.000 *** -0.070 -1.620  0.105 -0.116 -2.819  0.005 ***
0.038 4.732 0.000 *** 0.020 3.408 0.001 *** 0.017 2.582 0.010 *** -0.017 -2.564  0.011 **
-0.028 -1.268  0.205 -0.041 -2.517  0.012 ** 0.015 0.813 0.417 0.002 0.115 0.908
AF*Government -0.005 -0.107  0.915 -0.099 -2.854  0.004 *** 0.094 2.382 0.017 ** 0.052 1.115 0.265
AF*Foreign -0.022 -1.048  0.295 -0.019 -1.202  0.230 -0.009 -0.500  0.617 -0.035 -1.591  0.112
AF*Ethnic Indian -0.075 -0.876  0.381 -0.122 -1.972  0.049 ** 0.048 0.685 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000
-0.054 -2.709  0.007 *** -0.012 -0.805  0.421 -0.048 -2.937  0.003 *** -0.054 -2.418  0.016 **
-0.022 -1.838  0.066 * -0.013 -1.525  0.128 -0.009 -0.910  0.363 -0.003 -0.271  0.786
-0.050 -1.907  0.057 * -0.053 -2.735  0.006 *** 0.004 0.175 0.861 0.013 0.298 0.766
-0.065 -1.168  0.243 -0.111 -2.789  0.005 *** 0.050 1.104 0.270 -0.036 -0.431  0.667
-0.033 -1.274  0.203 -0.032 -1.689  0.092 * -0.012 -0.541  0.589 -0.186 -1.342  0.180
-0.030 -0.248  0.804 -0.113 -1.317  0.188 0.088 0.905 0.366 0.000 0.000 1.000
0.026 1.013 0.311 0.036 1.966 0.050 ** -0.008 -0.406  0.685 0.092 1.120 0.263
-0.006 -0.432  0.666 0.000 0.048 0.962 -0.007 -0.640  0.522 -0.042 -1.918  0.056 *
Industory Construction -0.056 -1.156  0.248 -0.067 -1.740  0.082 * 0.041 0.945 0.345 -0.132 -2.232  0.026 **
Communicati -0.026 -0.606  0.544 0.004 0.143 0.886 -0.028 -0.804  0.421 0.000 0.000 1.000
Hotel/Travel 0.010 0.316 0.752 0.052 2.163 0.031 ** -0.034 -1.238  0.216 -0.034 -1.026  0.305
Manufacturin 0.017 0.943 0.346 -0.028 -2.194  0.028 ** 0.041 2.836 0.005 *** -0.001 -0.067  0.946
Mining -0.054 -1.777  0.076 * -0.000 -0.010  0.992 -0.054 -2.206  0.028 ** -0.052 -1.316  0.189
Transportatio -0.002 -0.087  0.931 0.061 2.965 0.003 *** -0.041 -1.765  0.078 * -0.074 -2.606  0.009 ***
Retail 0.050 1.939 0.053 * -0.114 -6.134  0.000 *** 0.160 7.606 0.000 *** 0.009 0.344 0.731
Real Estate 0.007 0.337 0.737 -0.035 -2.115  0.035 ** 0.051 2.752 0.006 *** 0.004 0.192 0.847
F-statistics
note)  *, **, and *** singnificant at 10, 5, and 1percent level, respectively.
0.091759
4.92263 *** 8.78213 *** 7.85346 *** 3.76012 ***
Adjusted R square 0.079466 0.150402 0.134875
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Appendix 
(Table A-1) Estimation Results of Short-term Bank Borrowing Ratio and Company’s Fixed Effects 
 
coefficent t-value P-value coefficent t-value P-value
RISK 0.063 1.636 0.103 0.134 5.896 0.000 ***
TAX t-1 -0.090 -1.143 0.254 Ethnic Chinese 0.023 1.200 0.230
RE t-1 0.025 0.831 0.406 Government -0.070 -2.213 0.027 **
FIX t-1 -0.037 -1.207 0.228 Foreign 0.040 1.950 0.052 *
SIZE t-1 0.008 0.259 0.796 Ethnic Indian -0.116 -2.825 0.005 ***
AF*RISK 0.250 2.130 0.034 ** -0.017 -2.495 0.013 **
AF*TAX t-1 0.089 1.064 0.288 0.004 0.174 0.862
AF*RE t-1 -0.028 -0.501 0.617 AF*Government 0.052 1.136 0.256
AF*FIX t-1 0.076 1.303 0.193 AF*Foreign -0.032 -1.472 0.141
AF*SIZE t-1 0.007 0.294 0.769 AF*Ethnic Indian 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM*RISK 0.733 19.013 0.000 *** -0.056 -2.508 0.012 **
BM*TAX t-1 0.099 1.259 0.209 -0.004 -0.322 0.748
BM*RE t-1 -0.150 -1.055 0.292 0.013 0.295 0.768
BM*FIX t-1 -0.048 -0.374 0.708 -0.036 -0.427 0.669
BM*SIZE t-1 0.028 0.448 0.654 -0.179 -1.296 0.196
YD1996 -0.010 -0.849 0.396 0.000 0.000 1.000
YD1997 0.056 4.126 0.000 *** 0.087 1.062 0.289
YD2001 -0.100 -0.766 0.444 -0.041 -1.908 0.057 *
YD2002 -0.115 -0.870 0.385 Industory Construction -0.132 -2.240 0.025 **
YD2003 -0.109 -0.821 0.412 Communicatio 0.000 0.000 1.000
YD2004 -0.147 -0.387 0.699 Hotel/Travel -0.035 -1.075 0.283
YD2005 -0.096 -0.251 0.802 Manufacturing -0.001 -0.068 0.946
Mining -0.054 -1.363 0.173
Transportation -0.076 -2.660 0.008 ***
Retail 0.010 0.380 0.704
Real Estate 0.006 0.262 0.794




note)  *, **, and *** singnificant at 10, 5, and 1percent level, respectively.
Fixed















The number of observations 683
Adjusted R square 0.09172
AF*Ethnic Chinese
AF*Core
 